Definition
Threat modeling systematically identifies security risks:
\text{Threats} \times \text{Vulnerabilities} \times \text{Impact} \rightarrow \text{Risk}
In SCU terms: Threat modeling maps potential unauthorized χ-mode state transitions—analyzing how attackers could compromise information integrity.
The Question
"What can go wrong?"
Translated: "What unauthorized χ-mode transitions could occur?"
Process
- Scope: Which χ-mode systems are protected?
- Assets: Which χ-mode states are valuable?
- Threats: Who might attack χ-mode integrity?
- Vulnerabilities: How could χ-modes be compromised?
- Mitigations: How to prevent unauthorized transitions?
STRIDE Framework
| Threat | χ-Mode Attack |
|---|---|
| Spoofing | False χ-mode identity |
| Tampering | Unauthorized χ-mode change |
| Repudiation | Denying χ-mode actions |
| Information disclosure | Leaking χ-mode states |
| Denial of service | Blocking χ-mode access |
| Elevation | Unauthorized χ-mode privileges |
Attack Trees
Hierarchical threat decomposition:
\text{Goal} \leftarrow \text{Subgoals} \leftarrow \text{Actions}
Each leaf is a specific χ-mode attack vector.
Probability and Impact
\text{Risk} = P(\text{attack}) \times \text{Impact}
| Factor | Considers |
|---|---|
| Likelihood | Attacker capability and motivation |
| Impact | Value of compromised χ-mode states |
| Mitigation cost | Resources for defense |
Systematic vs Ad Hoc
Threat modeling provides structure:
- Complete coverage of χ-mode attack surface
- Prioritized risk assessment
- Defensible security decisions
The Key Insight
Threat modeling anticipates χ-mode attacks.
Security planning requires understanding potential failures:
- Assets = valuable χ-mode states
- Threats = potential unauthorized transitions
- Vulnerabilities = weak points in χ-mode protection
- Risk = probability × impact
By modeling threats before they occur, we can build systems that maintain χ-mode integrity against anticipated attacks.